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HITLER AND THE THIRD REICH

In this article Richard Overy throws light on the role Hitler played in shaping the course of German history by explaining how he came to power and the economic, political, military and racial policies of the Third Reich.

Adolf Hitler has always dominated the history of the Third Reich. Yet much of the recent writing on the Nazi movement and on German politics and society in the 1930s has put Hitler into a rather different perspective. Hitler is still a central figure in our explanation for what happened between 1933 and 1945, but he is not a sufficient explanation. He cannot be understood divorced from the society and political culture which made Nazism possible. The course of German history between the wars was not determined by Hitler alone but was shaped by economic, cultural and social forces of which Nazism was an integral part. The rise of Hitler and the establishment of a dictatorship which permitted him to launch German imperialism were neither inevitable nor irresistible, though they must sometimes have seemed so. The purpose of this article is to outline some of the forces which made this outcome possible, and to see where Hitler fits in in relation to them.

This is not to say that historians now reject the idea that Hitler matters. Even when he has been located in context, in the ideas, institutions and social forces that moulded his thinking and policy choices, the fact still remains that by the late 1930s Hitler's word was law. Knowing Hitler's own intentions gives us a good clue to the shifts in German policy and strategy. But such a degree of absolute authority was the result of the successful establishment of the 'myth of the Führer'. Through careful propaganda, through the deliberate cultivation of a style of leadership, Hitler was able to dominate German politics more than might have been expected from his own lack of experience and education. Hitler's function was to be the top of the pyramid of power and authority; he was the person who held the whole structure together; the man that Germans wanted to believe in. In this sense the intrinsic merits or faults of Hitler mattered less than his ability to perform the function assigned to him in the system. The fact that this function also permitted him increasingly to impose his own fantastic vision of a German Utopia on his political surroundings stemmed from the willingness of others to accept the Führer principle — that he led and they followed.

THE RISE OF NAZISM

There has always been a tendency in explaining the rise to power to place excessive emphasis on Hitler's messianic appeal, his force of personality, the power of propaganda, the mass rallies. Of course, it is important to see that in the crisis years before 1933 Hitler was sold to the public as the man who would solve all their problems — 'Hitler, our last hope', ran the election posters in 1932. But the success of this appeal cannot be understood unless we examine the socio-economic and political context in Germany in the 1920s. Hitler's appeal worked only because many ordinary Germans faced pressures so severe that they were prepared to grasp at straws.

The crisis of the 1920s has its roots in the long period of economic decline and stagnation that set in with the First World War. For 30 or 40 years before that the German economy had been one of the remarkable success stories of Europe. It had grown steadily at 3–4% a year, masking the social tensions that existed in the new Germany. A whole generation of German bourgeois had been brought up on rising properity and expectations. After 1919 these expectations were dashed. The German economy remained stagnant, and for much of the period between 1919 and 1933 it was coping with crisis. There was one short burst of growth between 1924 and 1928, but its fruits were confined largely to big industry and unionised labour.

We are so used to thinking of West Germany as a model of prosperity and economic advance, that it is difficult to grasp that in the 1920s large sections of the German community were impoverished. In 1913 a German professor earned ten times what a German coal-miner was paid; in the 1920s he earned only twice as much. A sense of relative deprivation was widespread among the respectable middle classes; harsh material deprivation was a reality for the poorer sections of the working classes, for low-paid craft workers, and for the bulk of the peasantry which still constituted one-third of the German population in the 1920s. High taxes, inflation, high interest rates, the slow revival of trade, all alienated the poorer sections of society from the political system imposed on them by defeat in 1918.

The collapse of expectations, widespread poverty and the decline in incomes provide a plausible explanation for the course of German politics. We are used to thinking of Germans in the Weimar Republic as being hostile to democracy. However, this is a case that is often overstated: there were broad sections in Germany which favoured the coming of democracy — social democrats, liberals, even the Catholic Centre Party, forerunner of modern Christian democracy. The real problem was that the stagnation of the German economy, and the very unequal distribution of the economic cake, made it more difficult to produce a workable, effective, democratic political culture. The conflict generated by Germany's poor economic performance fed into German politics: it brought a growing hostility between organised labour and Germany's middle classes; a resentment be-

ionised and non-unionised labour; a between village and city, peasantry orking-class, rich and poor.

absence of an effective democratic one that could reconcile social ten- d heal economic wounds, German began to break down in the mid-1920s at German historians now call 'corpor- ics'. Big business and the big unions e to cooperate with the state as ate power-blocs moulding the political to their advantage, able to take the re of what economic revival there s produced a growing sense among st of the population that they had be- marginalised politically and economical- explains the popular mood of anti- and anti-Marxism evident in the ars of the Republic. It also explains a ng disillusionment with Parliament. rmans felt that though they lived in ass politics, the democratic sys- as loaded against them.

small wonder that when the slump hit in 1928–29 (even before the Wall rash), it proved for many Germans the last straw. They had put up with in 1918; they had put up with revolu- 919; they had put up with hyper- n 1923; they had put up with a stag- onomy and a creaking political system. ey faced a recession so severe that by man industrial production was back vels of the 1890s and one in every Germans was unemployed. The slump ated the loss of confidence in the par- y system and finally convinced a ny Germans that the Weimar Repub- loaded in favour of big business and ctory working class, whose incomes are payments (so it was believed) them from the economic blizzard man farmers, craftsmen and shop- s.

for a great many Germans the hered in the greatest threat of all: a prospect of communist revolution. as a deep fear among Germany's mid- es and small producers, fuelled by ive communist rising in 1919 and by communist agitation during the infla- he German bourgeoisie had read their Marx; they knew that the collapse of capitalism, which seemed to be going on all around them, would usher in the age of the proletariat. And yet, for the conservative anti-Marxist masses in Germany, there appeared no obvious political solution. The bourgeois parties could find no strategy either to reverse the effects of the slump, or to combat communism. One alternative was to turn the clock back to the pre-1914 system, and resuscitate the old aristocratic conservative élite. This group had begun to rally again under the impact of the slump around the aristocratic president, Paul von Hindenburg. They began to think that at this acute moment of crisis in German history they might be called upon again to rescue Germany from her dilemma. Yet the crucial point about the politics of the late 1920s is that the anxious peasants and bourgeois, suffering economic deprivation, hostile to communism, were not attracted by the traditional conservative solution. The old élite had let them down in 1918; it had done nothing to blunt the impact of Allied vengeance, economic catastrophe or social threat. The conservative masses had had sufficient taste of mass politics to know that they could produce a political voice of their own. They no longer needed, or respected, the old conservative élite; they looked for a political mechanism that genuinely reflected their needs and prejudices.

They found this in the Nazi movement. Until 1928 Nazism was an insignificant political force trying to win factory workers away from Marxism, polling only about the same proportion of votes as the National Front did in Britain in the 1970s. It was a marginal political movement on the radical right. But under the impact of the slump, the rise of communism and the political stalemate of parliamentary politics the movement began to attract more attention. Nazism became the authentic voice of the small townsman, the anxious officials and small businessmen, the peasant who felt he had had a raw deal from the Republic, the teachers and state employees who felt they had lost out in terms of status and income to other groups. The Nazi Party was made up and led by people like this; Nazi leaders articulated their fears and desires, and promised to end the crisis. Nazism gave expression to the latent nationalism of the conservative masses by blaming the Allies and reparations for Germany's ills. Above all, Nazism was violently anti-Marxist. It was the only party demonstrably, visibly, combating the threat of communism on the streets. Although the violence alienated many respectable Germans, they hated communism more. Social disorder and disintegration seemed a reality in 1932 with eight million unemployed. In the chaos Nazism promised to restore order, to revive German fortunes, to bring about a moral renewal, to give 'bread and work'.

Under these circumstances more [illegible]e can be made of why one-third of the German electorate voted for Hitler. It was not an entirely irrational choice. Hitler was a true representative, not tainted with parliamentary corruption, not part of the traditional political classes, a man of the people whose own efforts, as he constantly reminded his listeners, had dragged him from local obscurity to national prominence. He promised to take the problems of his grass-roots supporters and give them a national platform. The great strength of the movement was not Hi[illegible]s messianic appeal, though that was impo[illegible], but the ability to get out into Germany's provincial cities and villages and mobilise people politically who were alienated from the established parties, or who had had no real experience of democratic participation. Peasant votes had been volatile during the 1920s; now they flooded to the Nazis, bringing perhaps as much as half Hitler's votes in 1932. Good organisation, constant propaganda, intim[illegible]tion, local visibility — these were the i[illegible]dients of Nazi success. It was a populist party, dependent on the excitement it generated and feeding off social disillusionment on a grand scale. From its nature, riding on the back of a massive economic slump and a temporary political crisis, it was a short-term phenomenon. If Hitler had not achieved the chancellorship in early 1933 the movement might well have burned itself out.

The irony is that Hitler achieved power not because of the great electoral bandwagon he had set in motion, but because of a final [illegible]tagem on the part of the traditional conserva- tives who thought they could manipulate Hit-

TABLE 1 REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT IN GERMANY, 1929–40 * ('000s)

	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940
	2,850.2	3,217.6	4,886.9	6,041.9	6,013.6	3,772.7	2,973.5	2,520.4	1,853.4	1,051.7	301.8	159.7
	3,069.7	3,365.8	4,971.8	6,128.4	6,000.9	3,372.6	2,764.1	2,514.8	1,610.9	946.3	196.3	123.8
	2,483.9	3,040.7	4,743.9	6,034.1	5,598.8	2,798.3	2,401.8	1,937.1	1,245.3	507.6	134.0	66.2
	1,711.6	2,786.9	4,358.1	5,739.0	5,331.2	2,608.6	2,233.2	1,762.7	960.7	422.5	93.9	39.9
	1,349.8	2,634.7	4,052.9	5,582.6	5,038.6	2,528.9	2,019.2	1,491.2	776.3	338.3	69.5	31.7
	1,260.0	2,640.6	3,953.9	5,475.7	4,856.9	2,480.8	1,876.5	1,314.7	648.4	292.2	48.8	26.3
	1,251.4	2,765.2	3,989.6	5,392.2	4,463.8	2,426.0	1,754.1	1,169.8	562.8	218.3	38.3	25.0
	1,271.9	2,882.5	4,214.7	5,223.8	4,124.2	2,397.5	1,706.2	1,098.4	509.2	178.7	33.9	23.1
	1,323.6	3,004.2	4,354.9	5,102.7	3,849.2	2,281.8	1,713.9	1,035.2	469.0	155.9	77.5	21.9
	1,557.1	3,252.0	4,623.4	5,109.1	3,744.8	2,226.6	1,828.7	1,177.4	501.8	163.9	79.4	—
	2,035.6	3,698.9	5,059.7	5,355.4	3,714.6	2,352.6	1,984.4	1,197.1	572.6	152.4	72.5	—
	2,850.8	4,383.8	5,668.1	5,772.9	4,059.0	2,604.7	2,507.9	1,478.8	994.7	455.6	104.4	—
ge	1,898.6	3,075.5	4,519.7	5,575.4	4,804.4	2,718.3	2,151.0	1,592.6	912.3	429.4	104.2	43.1

* From March 1935 including Saar; from March 1939 including Sudetenland; from June including Memel.

: *Statistiches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (Berlin, 1940), p.389.

ler if they invited him, and the mass following behind him, to share government. They believed that he would be tamed by office, and thay they would run the state again, imposing a reactionary conservative agenda while Hitler took care of the left. If this stratagem demonstrated anything, it showed a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Nazism and the revolutionary implications of the movement. The lesson should have been clear from the presidential election in the spring of 1932. The candidate of the old right, von Hindenburg, had been challenged by Hitler. The right-wing masses voted for the Nazi leader, leaving von Hindenburg dependent on the votes of the socialists, Catholics and eventually, on the second ballot, communists too. The new right rejected the restoration of aristocratic power and once Hitler was given the chancellorship, he unleashed the revolution. Within months Germany was a one-party state; within a year and a half Hitler was supreme ruler of Germany.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND NAZI SURVIVAL

It is often forgotten that if economic crisis helped Hitler to power before 1933, so it was Nazi success in stabilising the economy and producing sustained recovery after 1933 that helped to secure his political survival. This is a point that Hitler recognised right from the beginning of the regime: he knew that he had to redeem the promise of bread and work, economic recovery and social revival, because if he did not social tensions and political instability might well return. 'If there is success in solving this question', he told a meeting in July 1933, 'we have created for the new system a situation in which the government can realise step by step its other tasks. Work! Work!'[1]

This was a process that took not weeks or months but years. Until at least 1935 Hitler was still worried that the economic situation might undermine the political achievement. The Nazi dictatorship was not imposed in a [illegible], frictionless way. It had to produce results. By the beginning of 1935 there were still three million unemployed and many others on very low wages. Not until 1936–37 was the recovery established beyond doubt, and it is no coincidence that from this period political opposition became almost non-existent and the regime proved to be at its most popular.

How did the Nazi government succeed in stabilising the economy and producing an economic recovery more rapid than any other major state? There is no single, simple explanation. A simple answer might be rearmament, but much of the recent work on the German economy has demonstrated that rearmament only became a significant factor from 1935 onwards when, indeed, it became the engine of rapid economic growth. A more plausible answer lies in the simple fact of Hitler's political success in 1933. People wanted to believe that with a restoration of order, even Nazi order, and an end to parliamentary feebleness, economic recovery was possible.

Nazi propagandists trumpeted Hitler's success in giving bread and work.

Hitler profited from this psychological shift. But he did not mastermind the recovery. Instead, he hijacked German business and the German state economic machinery to do the work of achieving recovery for him. The Nazis were all at sea with economics; they knew what they wanted, but they recruited experts to do it for them.

There were three main features of this economic strategy which explain its success. The first was Germany's changed relationship with the world economy. From the day that Hitler came to power, Germany paid no more reparations; Germany defaulted on much of her external debt. The state established a barter trade system to avoid balance of payment crises, and cut Germany off from many of the pressures of the world economy, creating something close to a siege economy. This economic nationalism enjoyed much popular support at home, and ended German dependence on foreign loans and high levels of foreign trade.

The second strand was to establish state control over the German capital and credit system. This was necessary in an impoverished economy in order to get the wheels of industry turning again, and to provide funds to replace the foreign loans which Germany had lived on in the 1920s. Private investment was slow to revive and recovery was based on state funds and state direction of investment. This was a vital initiative because by 1932 the credit system in Germany had almost ground to a halt: no-one would lend money, no-one would willingly invest. Houses and roads fell into disrepair; machinery was not replaced. It was in these areas that the government put its financial effort. By 1938 the German state was investing five times as much public money as it did in 1933. Under the necessity of restarting the economy, Hitler established a strong interventionist system.

The third factor was the extension, again through state regulation, of strict controls over prices and wages. Many businessmen believed that unionised labour had kept wages too high in the 1920s and that this had caused economic stagnation. From 1933 onwards the state pegged wages at the level they had sunk to in the recession, and only allowed small adjustments upwards later in the war. The share of national income going to wages declined sharply between 1933 and 1938, while profits boomed. The abolition of trade unions in May 1933 prevented labour from arguing for more, while low wages encouraged business to invest again and re-employ a much cheaper workforce.

We should not exaggerate the recovery. It was a cautious, state-led revival which was not assured until 1936. But the evidence of revival, particularly re-employment, was clear enough for Nazi propagandists to trumpet Hitler's success in giving bread and work. This in itself explains much about the opposition to Nazism between 1933 and 1939. The economic success and the prospect of social renewal which it brought with it won for Hitler the grudging support even of groups that had not voted for him in 1932. The regime was adept at inducing in the popular mind the view that it was Hitler who had brought the revival. His personal popularity spread beyond the party faithful, the peasants and small traders who had voted him into power, and even began to embrace sections of the working class too. For those Germans who could not accept the propaganda peddled at them, there remained the passive attitude of 'wait and see', rather than commitment to formal opposition or underground resistance, both of which carried great risks of discovery and harsh repression. What resulted was a curious suspension of political life, a depoliticisation to replace the intensely political period of crisis before 1933. People stopped discussing politics, not only because a discussion of politics could all too easily lead to problems with the authorities, but because the Nazi movement itself suspended politics by turning all issues into 'national' issues. Resistance to state policies was resistance to the German community, not the party. In the same way Hitler successfully styled himself a national figure, above partisan interests, representative not of sectional interests but of all 'true' Germans.

Political opposition, to the extent that it survived at all, existed in two very different arenas. First, it existed among those trade union officials, communists and Social Democrats who met in secret cells, organised the distribution of pamphlets and newspapers, and kept alive, at great risk, the flame of left-wing radicalism. Very few of these secret organisations went undetected by the Gestapo. Huge numbers of left-wing opponents of the regime ended up in concentration camps, and a great number accepted voluntary exile. But it proved impossible, given the repressive nature of the regime and the ubiquitous activity of the party faithful, to build a broad base for opposition from the left.

The other source of resistance was the traditional conservative élite, whose political



naïveté had brought Hitler to power in the first place. This was a gradual estrangement; at first much of what Nazism did won their open approval. They were nationalist, anti-communist, hostile to the political working classes. For many of them hostility to Nazism was an expression not of conscientious revulsion against Nazi racism and plebeian politics, but a desire to salvage their political position and social status. Nazism undermined the position of this class and tried to replace it with a new establishment dominated by the ambitious petty-bourgeois circles which led it. Mass politics really did mean the end of the conservative claims to social predominance, their claims to be guardians of the national state bequeathed by Bismarck. But we should not ignore the fact that for many, resistance was born of a horror of Nazi behaviour in risking war and presecuting Jews. The conservative groups who unsuccessfully plotted Hitler's overthrow in 1938, 1939 and again in 1944 were willing to run risks, even to sacrifice themselves in the end to a horrible death, in defence of traditional principles and a decent German way of life.

THE COMING OF WAR

By 1936 Hitler had an economic recovery and a stable political system. That year he signalled a decisive change in the direction of his strategy and domestic policy, away from recovery and stabilisation to an active search for German international power. The promise to make Germany strong again was to be redeemed like the promise of bread and work. There was much support for this change. Traditional conservatives in the army and diplomatic corps were happy to challenge Versailles, to rearm, even to get back German colonies. Nazi radicals wanted to speed up the pace of foreign policy, to transfer to Europe the restless, violent revolutionism they had applied to German society. In this sense Hitler was not working in a political or ideological vacuum. But it was Hitler's own initiative, once he sensed the success of the Führer system, which provided the real drive for large-scale rearmament and German expansion. What others hesitated to do because of the international risks, Hitler insisted on carrying out. The more power became concentrated in his own hands, and the more secure his domestic position, the more he overrode his advisers and generals and demanded fulfilment of his own vision of *Lebensraum*, living-space, conquered and held by mighty armed power.

It has often been argued that Hitler, anxious about keeping the domestic political scene secure, opted for limited armaments and a piecemeal, opportunistic diplomacy. But recent evidence suggests that in 1936, when the Four-Year Plan was put into operation to prepare the economy and armed forces for war, Hitler's conception was for a radical transformation of the economy to serve a five or six year period of large-scale military build-up. Between 1936 and 1939 over two-thirds of all German industrial investment went into war-related projects. By 1939 over 23% of German national product, and 55% of government expenditure, went on direct military spending. All the hints that Hitler gave pointed towards his plan for a major war, ideally with the Soviet Union, in the mid-1940s, when Germany had built the sinews of superpowerdom. In the meantime even a partly armed Germany would be strong enough to extend economic and political domination over central Europe and frighten the Western powers into inactivity. Eastern Europe would provide the additional economic and manpower resources needed to complete the military plans.

This is often dismissed as mere fantasy. However, much of it had taken shape by 1939, and the attack on Poland was designed not to force the British and French into a fight, which Hitler did not want yet, but to round off the first stage of expansion into Eastern Europe, the economic springboard for the final struggle. Although rearmament on such a scale was creating economic tensions by 1939, they were not sufficient to create political unrest in a regime committed to violent repression. Hitler was prepared to go all-out for the German empire and through propaganda and coercion was determined to carry the German people, the disgruntled businessmen, and the sceptical generals with him. What he did not expect was the British and French resistance. The general war that broke out in September 1939 left Hitler, temporarily, at a loss. The economic transformation was not complete; the training and equipping of the armed forces were not finished either. The premature outbreak of war explains much of the muddle, confusion and

wastefulness of the German war economy after 1939, as officials and military leaders struggled to speed up the programmes and organise resources for a war they had not expected. The crisis was masked by the high operational skills of the German armed forces which brought Hitler the conquest of Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France and the Balkans by the summer of 1941. This startling success won him respect and support throughout German society, particularly from those who had doubted Germany's war capability, and now attributed success to the Führer's genius.

WAR AND RACE

As the pace of imperialism and military revival increased after 1936, so did the remorseless growth of active anti-Semitism. During the rise to power this had been more muted as Hitler strove for a respectable political image. After 1933 it was slowly but inexorably integrated into state policy. In 1936 the change of course was not simply a desire to execute wars to reverse the judgement of Versailles, but to promote racial war, which was to establish the ascendancy of the German race over the Eastern and Jewish *Untermenschen*. This racial conception was central to Hitler's thinking. War was the litmus test of racial virility; degenerate people went under, racially aware nations prospered.

Yet it is on just this question of race that the arguments about the role of Hitler have become most strident. There are two schools of thought on anti-Semitism. The first is called 'intentionalist' because it argues that we must take what Hitler said his intentions were at face value: he was always an anti-Semite and the destruction of Europe's Jews can be traced back to views expressed by Hitler throughout his political career. This individual commitment was then built into the strategies of the regime as it moved towards annihilation.

There is a second school, the 'functionalist' or 'structuralist', which argues that Hitler was, of course, an anti-Semite (there would be little point in arguing the contrary) but that the reason why this anti-Semitism eventually produced the Holocaust lies in other explanations than mere intention. These explanations are to do with the establishment of a racist bureaucracy, the gradual professionalisation and formalisation of racism, which produced a dynamic structure constantly promoting an intensification of the strategy. Radical racists were promoted in the party, and then legitimised their position by spurring others to greater racial efforts. By the time war came the top echelons of the party and state were dominated by much more naked anti-Semitism than had been the case in 1933. Moreover, the shift to extermination came only with the onset of major war. The circumstances of war permitted and legitimised this new strategy. Up until then Hitler had endorsed emigration, and Zionists and Nazis had cooperated together to get 57,000 German and Austrian Jews to Palestine between 1933 and 1940.[2] The war cut off this outlet, and it also brought large numbers of additional Jews under German rule in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union. The radical racists were able to transfer their racism outside Germany and could justify their actions — against Slavs as well as Jews — by the necessities of war, a conflict, as Hitler reminded his entourage regularly, to the racial death. Moreover, Germany was able to recruit and encourage the strong anti-Jewish sentiment in the East, where pogrom was still a constant threat.

None of this reduces Hitler's guilt, but it shows that there was no straight line between the expressed intention and political action. Like all the aspects of the Third Reich we have discussed here, there is a middle ground. Historians have to strike a balance in everything they write about between the actions and ideas of individuals and the circumstances and pressures which shape and permit those actions to take place. Without Hitler's anti-Semitism is is unlikely that the party would have adopted such a radical racist position during the war; but without the work of the racist organisation and the opportunities opened up by warfare the Holocaust might not now be part of history.

ɿ Hindenburg — symbol of aristocratic power — beside Adolf Hitler — leader of the new right.

THE PLACE OF HITLER

The role of Hitler in shaping German history must be tempered by context and circumstance, but it cannot be ignored. There were three distinct ways in which Hitler as an individual played a crucial part. First of all, Hitler was able to pose before 1933 as a kind of messiah, a man who would somehow or other cut through the conflicts and contradictions of German history and establish a sound German polity. This was how he was sold to the electorate, and it is not unlikely that he believed it himself. Second, Hitler became the leader after 1933, performing the function of leadership, creating a system which depended on the leadership principle in order to work. This function was deliberately, self-consciously, manufactured by Hitler and the Nazi propaganda machine. This enabled many Germans to separate Hitler from the party, to support the leader but to despise his lieutenants.

Finally, we come to Hitler the radical imperialist, the man who dreamt of German world power and racial victory. Even though he did not write down a detailed blueprint for world conquest or for the annihilation of the Jews, there can be little doubt that Hitler's own intellectual preconceptions, the view of foreign policy as a struggle of nature, his view of domestic politics as biological in character, began increasingly to dictate what was possible in German politics. The more power the function of leader produced for Hitler, the easier it was to move from intention to practice. In other words, the more the function of leader became the critical function in the Third Reich, the more Hitler's own ideas, irrational though they were, came to dominate the policy choices facing Germany and the less he was constrained by circumstance and resistance.

NOTES

(1) Minuth, K-H. (ed.) (1983) *Akten der Reichskanzlei: Regierung Hitler 1933–1938* Boldt, Vol. I, p.632, doc.180.
(2) Nicosia, F. R. (1986) *The Third Reich and the Palestine Question*, London, Appendix 7.

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